CONCLUSION OF INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL
PRESS RELEASE
PRESS RELEASE
ANTITRUST AUTHORITY CONCLUDES FOOTBALL INQUIRY
TEN RULES FOR MARKET LIBERALISATION PROPOSED TO FIGC
ELIMINATE REGISTER OF AGENTS, LIMIT AGENT-PLAYER EXCLUSIVES, CANCEL PENALTIES FOR TERMINATING CONTRACTS, SEVER ALL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN AGENTS AND THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS
The Italian Competition Authority, at its meeting on 24 May 2006, decided to conclude one part of its fact-finding study into professional football (soccer) and approved a number of guidelines which should be included in the new regulations for agents currently being studied by the top management of the Italian Football Federation (FIGC).
The analysis carried out showed that the FIGC's regulations for agents contain provisions which bear no relationship to the FIFA Regulations.
Those provisions may significantly condition the conduct of players' agents in the marketplace, to the point of inhibiting free competition between the operators and possibly encouraging collusive behaviour.
A football agent's role is that of a typical business activity, so that there can be no special consideration of the fact that he is dealing specifically with football and therefore the activity is one which lends itself to the creation of a syndicate or "trust" as foreseen in the anti-trust laws.
In this context, the Authority believes it is necessary to modify those provisions of the current FIGC Regulations which introduce unjustified restraints on this activity.
Specifically, the regulations examined give rise to antitrust considerations regarding: i) restrictions on access to the profession; ii) the standardization of contractual relationships between agents and players; iii) restrictive clauses; iv) the unsuitability of the current conflict-of-interest provisions to guarantee equal opportunity to agents operating in the marketplace. Ten proposals for changes to the Regulations follow.
1) ELIMINATE THE REGISTER OF AGENTS. As regards restrictions on entry to the profession of agent, it must be noted that the obligation to be recorded in a specific Register of Agents, on pain of penalty, is not in line with "need and proportionality", given that the examination for obtaining a licence is in itself a sufficient tool for guaranteeing that access to the profession is limited to qualified individuals. The further obligation to register represents an unjustified barrier to entry.
On this point, the Authority believes that the FIGC Regulations should be modified to stipulate, in line with FIFA's Regulations for Agents, that for the purposes of entry to the profession of football players' agent it is sufficient to obtain a licence.
2) LIMIT AGENT-PLAYER EXCLUSIVE DEALING ARRANGEMENTS. As regards the provisions in the Regulations which standardize contractual relations between agent and player, the obligation to use “exclusively” the forms provided by the Commission, to the extent that they specify exclusive dealing arrangements and other contractual conditions, is in restraint of competition among agents.
3) NO PENALTY FOR CANCELLING AN APPOINTMENT. This has to do both with the stipulation of penalties against the player if he should decide to change and also the requirement that an appeal should be heard before the FIGC's arbitration commission in the case of dispute.
4) FREER CONTRACTS. Greater contractual freedom would lead agents to compete amongst themselves regarding the conditions offered to their clients and would provide players with better information in choosing their agent. So just like the FIFA Regulations, those of the FIGC should allow the parties the freedom to define the terms of their contract.
5) NO CLAUSES REGARDING EXPIRATION OF CONTRACTS. There are many provisions in the Regulations which are "restrictive". In particular, besides the above-mentioned obligations on the player who wishes to terminate the contract before its expiration, there are important rules which oblige the player to pay a fee to his agent even when the playing contract he obtains is not a result of the agent's efforts.
6) GREATER FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR PLAYERS. Further restrictions derive from the obligation to appoint a single exclusive agent and the prohibition on contacting a player to induce him to change his agent.
The above-mentioned provisions are in restraint of trade since, besides strongly discouraging a player from approaching a new agent, they also reduce the agent's incentive to diversify his business and to demonstrate his efficiency in procuring better playing contracts.
7) GREATER COMPETITION AMONG AGENTS. The conclusion is that the above provisions, which find no correspondence in FIFA's Regulations, must be amended to allow for effective competition amongst agents in the marketplace.
8) ELIMINATE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. The FIGC Regulations are also inadequate in dealing with so-called conflicts of interest.
It has been noted that the existence of a family relationship between an agent and an important figure in a football club or company or in a federation provides a competitive advantage which is not due to the greater efficiency of the agent. Agents should instead be motivated to compete on the basis of their professional abilities, thus benefiting the players in their expectations regarding playing contracts. For this reason, the Authority considers that the role of agent should be forbidden to persons whose relatives hold management or technical positions in clubs or federations and that, in any case, agents should not be allowed to manage negotiations where the objects or beneficiaries of their activities are relatives or close family members. Likewise, persons who are related to an agent should be forbidden from occupying positions in football companies or management and technical positions in clubs or federations.
9) EXCLUSION OF COMMON AGENTS FOR PLAYERS AND COACHES. Furthermore, theAuthority sees problems for competition in the hypothesis, not covered by the FIGC Regulations, where an agent represents players and coaches at the same time. More generally, it has been observed that representing differing and potentially conflicting interests may condition the freedom of choice of the various persons involved in the relationship.
It is therefore proposed that the Regulations should expressly exclude the possibility that the same agent may represent coaches and players at the same time or, at the very least, that he may represent the coach and players of the same team.
10) ELIMINATE RULES THAT OBSTRUCT THE MARKET. It must be further noted that the market seems to present on the one hand a certain stability in operators' market shares, and on the other hand the presence, amongst the most notable of those operators, of persons related to important figures in professional football clubs. This may be traced back in large part to those regulatory provisions which upset the competitive dynamics among market operators (such as the clauses providing for double penalties, the obligation to give an exclusive contract to a single agent, the prohibition on contacting a player to convince him to change agent) and also to the absence of an explicit prohibition on the exercise of the profession of agent by persons who might benefit, in contrast with their competitors, from privileged forms of relationship with top representatives of football clubs or federations.
Based on these considerations, the Authority recommends that the FIGC modify as suggested, in short order, the Regulations governing the exercise of the profession of football players' agent, because the changes suggested would help re-establish the conditions for the correct functioning of the market.
Rome, 24 May 2006
ATTACHMENTS
Table A – Market shares by volume - top 5 operators (2002-2006)
| Operator (group or individual agent) | Average share in 2002-06 (The share quoted is the simple mathematical average of market shares held by the operators in the seasons under consideration) |
| GEA WORLD S.P.A. | 10.20 |
| P.D.P. S.R.L. | 3.52 |
| I.F.A. DI GIUSEPPE BONETTO & C. S.A.S. | 3.34 |
| T.L.T. S.R.L. | 3.25 |
| P&P PASTORELLO AND PARTNERS S.A.S | 3.07 |
Table B– Market shares by value – top 15 operators (last two seasons)
| Operator (group or individual agent) | Market share (%) |
| GEA WORLD S.P.A. | 17.9 |
| P.D.P. S.R.L. | 9.4 |
| T.L.T. S.R.L. | 6.9 |
| BRANCHINI ASSOCIATI S.P.A. | 5.6 |
| FEDELE GAETANO | 4.9 |
| FOOTBALL SERVICE S.A.S. | 4.5 |
| I.F.A. DI GIUSEPPE BONETTO & C. S.A.S. | 3.7 |
| DELLAGLIO ANTONIO | 3.4 |
| I.F.A. DI MARCELLO BONETTO &C S.A.S. | 2.3 |
| PLAYGROUND S.A.S. | 2.3 |
| BOZZO GIUSEPPE | 2.3 |
| CONSPORT GROUP S.R.L. | 2.2 |
| ATC DI TIBERIO CAVALLERI S.A.S. | 2.1 |
| SPORT SERVICE S.R.L. | 1.7 |
| BASTIANELLI PATRIK | 1.7 |
Table C – Market shares by value – top 15 individual agents (last two seasons)
| Agent | Market share (%) |
| MOGGI ALESSANDRO | 12.3 |
| D’AMICO ANDREA | 8.6 |
| TINTI TULLIO | 6.9 |
| FEDELE GAETANO | 5.0 |
| ZAVAGLIA FRANCESCO | 4.8 |
| ANTONELLI STEFANO | 4.2 |
| BRANCHINI GIOVANNI UBALDO | 3.6 |
| DELL’AGLIO ANTONIO | 3.4 |
| BONETTO GIUSEPPE | 2.9 |
| BOZZO GIUSEPPE | 2.3 |
| BONETTO MARCELLO | 2.2 |
| CAVALLERI TIBERIO | 2.1 |
| CANOVI DARIO | 2.0 |
| PALLAVICINO CARLO | 2.0 |
| ROGGI MORENO | 1.9 |